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This paper uses new administrative data with detailed borrower information and
lengthy repayment histories from the Canada Student Loans Program (CSLP) to mea-
sure rates of return on undergraduate student loans. We document substantial het-
erogeneity in returns based on information available at the time loans were disbursed,
including province of residence, field of study, and institution of attendance. Field of
study is a particularly important determinant of rates of return, explaining 22% of the
variation in predicted returns across borrowers. We explore the implications of this
variation for CSLP cross-subsidization across borrowers and potential risk-based loan
limits. Given the variation in ex ante predicted returns across borrowers, using all
available information at the time of loan disbursement, we study the implications of
potential cream-skimming of high-return borrowers by private lenders.
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1 Introduction
The rising costs of and returns to education over the past few decades have caused many
countries to re-evaluate the structure of their higher education financing systems. The ef-
ficient structure of these systems, including government student loan programs, depends
critically on the strength of various market frictions stemming from incomplete information
and imperfect enforcement considerations (Lochner and Monge-Naranjo, 2016). This moti-
vates a broad research agenda aimed at identifying and quantifying these market frictions
(see, e.g., Bachas, 2019; Mueller and Yannelis, 2019; Karamcheva et al., 2020; Yannelis, 2020;
Lochner et al., 2021).
This paper uses newly available administrative data on student borrowing and repayment
from the Canada Student Loans Program (CSLP) to estimate the returns on undergraduate
student loans to the government, focusing on heterogeneity in these returns across borrow-
ers.1 Variation in predictable returns across students raises concerns about the efficiency of
student loan programs and implies ex ante cross-subsidization, where borrowers with high
expected returns effectively subsidize those with low expected returns. This gives rise to con-
cerns that private creditors may undercut government loan programs by cream-skimming,
i.e. poaching profitable borrower types and leaving the government with unprofitable ones.2
This can raise program costs, forcing governments to raise interest rates on student loans
(driving more high-return borrowers away), reduce loan limits, or subsidize remaining pools
of borrowers. While we examine return heterogeneity and cream-skimming based on eas-
ily observed differences across borrowers, unobserved differences would further exacerbate
adverse selection concerns.
A major challenge to estimating returns on student loans is a lack of publicly available
data on repayment records covering much of the repayment period. As a result, previous
studies have typically examined student loan repayment status, such as default rates or the
proportion of loan repaid, a few years after students leave school (Gross et al., 2009; Looney
and Yannelis, 2015). Yet, Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2015) show that knowing whether
borrowers had ever defaulted or are currently in default as of some arbitrary date (especially
early in the repayment process) need not provide an accurate picture of returns on student
1We make no effort to measure the welfare benefits of student loans (overall or to specific borrowers),
which depends on the value of loans to students as well as any gains/losses to the government.
2This practice is already underway in the US by companies such as SoFi (Kosir et al., 2015). Using data
from a student loan refinancing firm, Bachas (2019) provides a careful analysis of these issues in the U.S.,
including the impact of offering risk-based interest rates in the student loan market on borrower welfare and
government revenue.
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loans or how those returns differ across borrowers.
In this paper, we use CSLP data on loan disbursements, needs determination, and re-
payments available from 2003–2004 to 2015–2016, which provide extensive information on
borrowers and nearly complete repayment streams for those entering repayment in the mid-
2000s. Based on these data, we compute a measure of the realized return on each student
loan disbursed to the cohort of upper-year undergraduate borrowers that attended public
post-secondary schools in Canada in 2005. While our primary measure of returns reflects
the net profit on a loan relative to the amount issued, we also report internal rates of return
for various subgroups of borrowers.
We begin by estimating average returns to the CSLP for the full cohort of borrowers, as
well as for different observable groups based on their demographic characteristics, province,
field of study, and post-secondary institution—all factors known by the CSLP at the time
loans are disbursed. Our estimates suggest that the CSLP lost about 7 cents for every
loan dollar disbursed to upper-year undergraduates in 2005, with considerable heterogeneity
across different types of borrowers. Heterogeneity across borrowers enrolled in different fields
is substantial, implying considerable ex ante cross-subsidization from borrowers majoring in
Health Sciences to those majoring in Arts/Sciences. We also show that borrowers who default
during the first 3 years of repayment generate sizeable negative returns for the CSLP, while
those who experience no early repayment problems earn the CSLP modest positive returns
averaging 3%. Early default rates are also negatively correlated with average rates of return
when looking across borrowers from different provinces, fields of study, or institutions.
Finally, we estimate borrower-specific predicted returns based on all information available
at the time of loan disbursement, documenting the considerable variation in expected returns
across borrowers. Altogether, the factors observed in CSLP records explain 12% of the
variation in realized returns. Based on the empirical distribution of predicted returns, we
estimate that aggressive poaching of high-return students by private lenders could exacerbate
losses by the CSLP by 1 to 3 percentage points. If the government were to set field-specific
loan limits to ensure non-negative average returns for borrowers in each field, our estimates
suggest that loan limits would differ by as much as $20,000 between Arts/Sciences majors
and Health Science majors.
We provide an overview of the CSLP in Section 2, while Section 3 discusses our measures of
returns on student loans. Section 4 describes the CSLP data, as well as our sample selection
criteria. Section 5 characterizes measured rates of return on CSLP loans, the estimated
importance of observable factors for those returns, and the distribution of predicted rates of
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return. Section 6 examines the relationship between measures of early repayment problems
(i.e., default and enrolment in repayment assistance) and our measures of returns based on
the full repayment cycle. Section 7 discusses cross-subsidization across borrowers in different
fields of study, risk-based student loan limits, and the potential impacts of cream-skimming
by private lenders. Section 8 concludes with some broader lessons and directions for future
reseach.
2 Student Borrowing and Repayment in Canada
Working in collaboration with most provincial/territorial governments, the CSLP provides
loans and grants to help Canadian students pay for post-secondary education based on their
financial need.3 In 2005–2006, the loan year we study, roughly 345,000 Canadian students
(41% of all post-secondary students in participating provinces) borrowed nearly $2 billion
($5,600 per borrower) from the CSLP, while the average university student held a total loan
balance of $14,700 (Office of the Chief Actuary, 2007).
As long as students remain in school, Canada student loans accrue no interest and need
not be repaid. Six months after leaving school, all loans received during school are combined
into a single repayment plan in a process known as consolidation, at which time repayment
begins.4 Consolidation establishes the repayment agreement, including the amortization pe-
riod and interest rate. The standard repayment plan entails a constant debt-based payment
with an amortization period of 9.5 years, which can be extended up to 14.5 years under
special circumstances. Borrowers can choose a floating interest rate (the default option) or
a fixed interest rate.5 Nearly everyone chooses the floating rate (see, e.g., Office of the Chief
Actuary, 2019).
Borrowers experiencing periods of financial hardship can apply for reduced payments
through the CSLP’s Repayment Assistance Plan (RAP) for a period of six months; however,
they are not automatically enrolled in the program and must re-apply if they have continued
3All provinces and territories participate in the CSLP, except Quebec, the Northwest Territories and
Nunavut, which operate their own financial assistance programs and receive alternative funding from the
federal government.
4During our sample period, interest accrued during the grace period (i.e., between the end of schooling
and consolidation), although this practice ended in November 2019.
5Prior to 2019, the floating interest rate was the prime rate plus 2.5 percentage points and the fixed rate
was prime plus 5 percentage points. Effective November 2019, the floating interest rate was lowered to prime
and the fixed rate was lowered to prime plus 2 percentage points. Interest rates have been set to zero during
the Covid-19 pandemic.
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need.6 Under RAP, eligible borrowers whose family incomes fall below the minimum fam-
ily size-based threshold (e.g., $25,000 for singles and $59,500 for families of four) need not
make any payments, while those with family incomes above the threshold are expected to
contribute an increasing fraction (ranging from 0 to 20 percent) of their incomes above the
threshold toward their student loan (unless this income-based amount exceeds the standard
debt-based payment set to ensure repayment within 15 years of consolidation, in which case
they must only pay this amount). Among the 26% of borrowers on RAP in 2018–2019,
the vast majority made no payment at all (Employment and Social Development Canada,
2020).
RAP entails two stages. During Stage 1 (Interest Relief), any reduced payment by the
borrower goes toward principal first. The government pays all interest not covered by the
borrower’s payment, but the government does not pay any amount towards the loan principal.
Eligible borrowers can receive this benefit for up to 60 months. In Stage 2 (Debt Reduction),
which begins after 60 months in Stage 1 or 10 years after finishing school (whichever comes
first), the government pays all interest and principal amounts not covered by the borrower’s
reduced payment in such a way that student debt is completely eliminated within 15 years
of leaving school.7
Despite the availability of RAP, many student loans still end up in default (i.e., 9 months
or more of consecutive missed payments).8 Indeed, 3-year default rates have hovered around
10% for the last several borrower cohorts. When a loan enters default, it is sent to the Canada
Revenue Agency (CRA) for collection through tax offsets, wage garnishments, judgments
against borrowers, and other standard collection efforts.
Borrowers who default or enroll in RAP generate significant losses for the CSLP.9 In March
2019, the government expected to lose 77% of all loan dollars in default and 25% of all dollars
in RAP (Office of the Chief Actuary, 2019).
6RAP was introduced in 2009 and replaced two related repayment assistance programs known as Interest
Relief (IR) and Debt Reduction in Repayment (DRR). Borrowers in financial difficulty could receive interest
payments from the government for up to 54 months on IR; however, IR did not help with loan principal
payments. After exhausting IR eligibility, borrowers continuing to face financial difficulties could receive up
to 3 separate loan principal reductions (totaling up to $26,000) from DRR. See Appendix 1 of Office of the
Chief Actuary (2019) for additional details. Throughout the paper, we do not distinguish between different
forms of repayment assistance (i.e., RAP, IR, and DRR), simply referring to all as RAP.
7Borrowers with permanent disabilities skip Stage 1 and enter Stage 2 directly. Repayment assistance for
these borrowers is such that student debt is eliminated within 10 years of leaving school.
8See Lochner et al. (2021) for a detailed analysis of RAP take-up decisions and an analysis of why many
borrowers continue to make standard payments or default despite being eligible for RAP.
9A very small fraction of borrowers enter bankruptcy during their repayment period. In general, borrowers
filing for bankruptcy are not shielded from student loan payments if they file within 7 years of leaving school.
However, student loan debt is eligible for discharge, along with other debts, beyond the seven year point.
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3 Measuring Returns on Student Loans
There are several ways to measure the profitability of a particular loan or set of loans issued
by the government. We focus on two measures of nominal returns that we use throughout
our analysis. We loosely refer to our first measure as the realized return on a particular loan.
To calculate this return, we first compute the value that the lender would have attached to
the ex post realized sequence of payments had it known that sequence ex ante. The realized
return is then simply measured as the percent difference between that ex post government
value and the initial loan amount. It reflects the ex post net profit on a loan relative to the
amount issued and is analogous to the (net) benefit/cost ratio often used in analyses of early
childhood and other educational programs.
The second measure we consider is the Internal Rate of Return, or IRR, which we compute
for sets of loans issued to various subsets of the student population. This measure is com-
monly used in finance and, increasingly, in studies of educational investments which entail
significant initial outlays and a lengthy period of returns. This section formally defines and
discusses these measures.
Since we are particularly interested in understanding the extent to which returns can
be predicted ex ante based on information available to the government—or lenders more
generally—at the time loans are issued, this section also describes our approach for estimating
predicted returns (based on realized returns). We discuss our data and several practical
challenges in computing returns in Section 4.
3.1 Realized Return
Consider a loan issued to student i at date t = 0 for amount Li,0. Over the life of the loan,
the student makes a sequence of payments denoted Pi = {Pi,t}Tt=1, where T is the horizon of
the loan. In practice, these payments may reflect standard debt-based payments, payments
while on RAP, or collections during default. If the government knew ex ante this stream of
payments, it would value it at present discounted value




where d is the appropriate (constant) discount rate. One can think of this discount rate as
the cost of funds for the government, which we measure by the cost of issuing debt of similar
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horizons as the loans.10 The realized return, then, is simply given by
Ri(Li,0, Pi, d) =
PDV (Pi, d)− Li,0
Li,0
. (1)
Loans that earn a net profit will have a positive realized return, while those entailing net
losses will have a negative realized return.
For additional perspective on this return measure, note that if the interest rate on the
loan is the same as the government’s discount rate (i.e., r = d) and a student makes all the
prescribed payments over the horizon of the loan, then the realized return on that loan is zero.
This follows from the fact that standard debt payments are set so that Li,0 = PDV (Pi, r).
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With d < r, which is our benchmark, loans that are fully repaid are profitable for the
government. In practice, these profits help offset losses from borrowers who fail to repay
their loans in full.
When d 6= r, the timing of payments matters. For example, the most profitable loan with
d < r is one that is fully repaid, with interest, in the final period, yielding a return to the
government of Rmax = [(1 + r)/(1 + d)]
T − 1 > 0. In practice, repayment streams are often
erratic, with the return bounded between -1 (for loans with no payments made) and Rmax.
3.2 Internal Rates of Return (IRR)
In multi-period settings, a standard measure of the return on an investment—a student
loan in our case—with any given realized stream of payments is given by the Internal Rate
of Return, IRR, defined as the discount rate which makes the present discounted value of
payments equal to the original loan amount, i.e. PDV (P, IRR) = L0.
For our purposes, the IRR has three undesirable properties as a measure of returns on
individual loans. First, it need not be unique when loan repayment streams are erratic.
Second, the IRR is not defined when payments are zero. Third, the interpretation of the IRR
as a meaningful measure of returns on an investment implicitly assumes that payments are
re-invested in the same “project” (i.e., borrower) at rate IRR, an unattractive assumption in
the context of student loans. A more appealing assumption is that payments received from
10For a comprehensive view of the cost of issuing student loans in the U.S., see Lucas and Phaup (2010)
and Lucas and Moore (2010).
11With a constant interest rate, students make a constant actuarially fair payment every period given by
Pt = P =
r(1 + r)T
(1 + r)T − 1
L0.
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a portfolio of student loans are re-invested in the form of loans to similar students. Such
a portfolio would tend to have strictly positive and less variable total repayment streams
than individual loans subject to considerable idiosyncratic risk. For these reasons, we use
the IRR as a measure of returns on sets of loans issued to subgroups of students who share
important characteristics, such as post-secondary field of study or type of institution.
3.3 Average and Predicted Realized Returns
We are particularly interested in cross-subsidization across borrowers and the potential for
cream-skimming by private lenders. Both depend critically on differences in ex ante expected
returns across borrowers. Although we have no way of knowing what the government (or
other lenders) actually expected the returns to be on any given loan or set of loans, we can
estimate ex post expected returns on past loans.12
As noted above, we calculate IRR measures that characterize the returns on loans disbursed
to subgroups of borrowers. It is also straightforward to estimate expected returns for different
subgroups of borrowers based on Ri (see equation (1)), either using the simple average of
returns or loan-weighted average returns (i.e., weighting borrowers by their loan amounts,
Li,0). While the simple average provides a measure of expected returns for borrowers in
the specified group, the loan-weighted average measures expected returns on the total loan
amount disbursed to borrowers in that group.
We can also estimate the expected returns for borrowers conditional on their observed
characteristics Xi, E(Ri|Xi), using a basic multivariate regression approach. Consider a
simple model of returns Ri = X
′
iβ+εi, where the vector Xi includes observable characteristics
such as the amount borrowed, demographic characteristics, field of study or major, and
institution of attendance, while εi reflects idiosyncratic variation in returns conditional on
Xi (with E(εi|Xi) = 0). In this case, regressing Ri on Xi yields the estimated coefficient
vector β̂, which can be used to calculate predicted returns R̂i ≡ X ′iβ̂ for a borrower with
characteristics Xi. In the absence of aggregate risk, these predicted returns would provide an
estimate of ex ante expected returns for lenders with rational expectations, i.e., E(Ri|Xi).
12Ex ante and ex post expected returns may differ due to aggregate shocks that similarly affect many
borrowers.
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4 Data from the Canada Student Loans Program
In principle, it is straightforward to calculate the returns on loans given data on loan amounts
and the full history of repayments. In practice, loan records are imperfect and full repayment
histories are rarely available. In this section, we discuss the data and sample used to calculate
returns and briefly describe our efforts to address these practical challenges.
4.1 Data Overview
We exploit newly available administrative data from the Education and Labor Market Longi-
tudinal Platform (ELMLP) provided by Statistics Canada. This platform provides longitudi-
nal data from the CSLP beginning with the 2003–2004 academic/loan year.13 The version we
use includes recipient-level longitudinal information for 13 years through the 2015–2016 loan
year. These data include information on the loan application process, loan disbursement,
and annual repayment amounts for each borrower. The CSLP data also contain information
on each borrower’s institution of enrolment, field of study, and basic demographics. As such,
these data provide a unique opportunity to study the distribution of realized returns condi-
tional on a rich set of observable borrower characteristics, enabling us to estimate expected
returns for different individuals or subsets of individuals, as outlined in Section 3.
4.2 Sample Selection
Given our interest in rates of return on student loans at the undergraduate level, we limit
the sample to individuals who received student loans for full-time undergraduate studies
during the 2005–2006 loan year. Focusing on this “2005 cohort” of borrowers ensures a
lengthy period of observed payments.14 The longest repayment history we observe is 11
years (from 2005–2006 to 2015–2016), covering the full 9.5-year duration of standard debt-
based repayment in Canada.
Our sample begins with all undergraduate borrowers attending Canadian public post-
secondary institutions who were between the ages of 18 and 30 in 2005.15 Because some
13The CSLP loan year starts August 1st and ends July 31th of the following calendar year. The ELMLP
allows for linkage to other administrative data sources, including tax records from T1 Family Files (T1FF)
and data from the Post-Secondary Information System (PSIS).
14Unfortunately, loan records prior to 2005 contain many inconsistencies (see Section 4.3).
15While the CSLP classifies law, dentistry, and medical students as undergraduates, nearly all of these
students are older and have already completed a separate undergraduate program. We, therefore, treat
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borrowers continue their undergraduate studies well after the 2005–2006 academic year, or
go on to other levels of study (e.g., non-degree, Master’s, PhD), the final loan consolidation
year varies from borrower to borrower. To ensure that we observe repayment histories of at
least 8 years after consolidation for each borrower (we impute payments beyond the sample
period as discussed below), we impose two additional restrictions on our sample. First, we
restrict our sample to upper-year undergraduates (i.e., students in their 3rd or 4th year of
studies) in 2005: for reasons discussed below, returns are likely to be lower for 1st and 2nd
year students. Second, we restrict our sample to borrowers who consolidate by their 6th year
since beginning their undergraduate studies. This includes about two-thirds of all 3rd and
4th year undergraduates who borrowed in 2005.16 On one hand, this restriction likely yields
a negatively selected sample and depressed rates of return, because more students continue
on to post-graduate studies (typically associated with higher earnings) than extend their
undergraduate studies beyond 6 years. On the other hand, students attending post-graduate
studies tend to borrow more and begin their repayment much later (with no interest accruing
while in school), which likely lowers rates of return on their loans received in 2005. Appendix
Table A1 shows that excluding borrowers who consolidate late has only modest effects on the
distribution of borrower characteristics and early repayment behavior. We leave it to future
work, when longer repayment histories become available, to examine the full implications of
this assumption and broader distributions of returns for all undergraduates.
4.3 Inconsistent Loan Records
We address two main inconsistencies in the CSLP administrative data. First, we find that the
accounting identity requiring that the amount of principal repaid plus amount of principal
outstanding must equal the original loan consolidation amount is not always respected. In
many cases, there is an obvious explanation (confirmed through conversations with CSLP
officials), which we address as appropriate.17 In other cases, there is no easy explanation:
them as graduate students and exclude them from our analysis. Due to extremely small sample sizes and
confidentiality concerns, we also exclude students with a field of “trades” and 4th-year students at the
University of Ontario Institute of Technology, which was newly founded in 2002.
16Specifically, we restrict our sample to borrowers who consolidate their loans by 2008 for 3rd year students
and by 2007 for 4th year students. Among borrowers who received an undergraduate loan disbursement in
their 3rd year in 2005 and consolidated between 2005 and 2015, 68% consolidated their loan by 2008 (1% in
2005, 14% in 2006, 35% in 2007, and 17% in 2008). Among those who were in their 4th year in 2005, 66%
consolidated their loan between 2005 and 2007 (5% in 2005, 46% in 2006, and 16% in 2007).
17For example, some borrowers have multiple loan consolidations due to leaving and returning to school.
The loan consolidation amount should be cumulative, reflecting the total outstanding balance at the time;
however, sometimes the later loan consolidation amount clearly does not include outstanding amounts from
previous consolidations. In these cases, a discrepancy arises between the repayment record and the reported
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discrepancies can result from coding errors or changes in the reporting system over time
and across service providers. Among those discrepancies that are not readily understood,
we exclude borrowers for which the absolute discrepancy is at least 5% of the consolidation
loan amount.
The second type of inconsistency observed in our data relates to the dynamics of cumulative
loan repayment amounts, which should be non-decreasing. We observe a large share of
decreasing cases for borrowers in British Columbia in loan-year 2011–12 associated with the
integration of BC provincial loans with federal CSLP loans that year. These cases were
easily resolved following consultation with CSLP officials. Across other provinces and years,
inconsistencies in cumulative repayment amounts are rare, typically small in value, and have
little impact on our analysis.
Altogether, we exclude about 4,400 borrowers due to sizeable unexplained discrepancies
in initial loan balances and another 40 borrowers due to sizeable discrepancies in cumula-
tive repayments over time. These exclusions have negligible impacts on the distribution of
characteristics, choices, and outcomes we study. See Appendix A for further details.
4.4 Incomplete Loan Histories
In practice, we do not observe the entire repayment history for many borrowers. Although
we observe payments for 8–11 years since consolidation in our sample, many borrowers have
not fully repaid their loans within this time frame.
For borrowers still making regular payments or enrolled in RAP, we impute payments
after our final sample period (2015) using information on their last observed loan status,
payment amount, and outstanding balance. In particular, we use data from borrowers who
consolidate in earlier years (and, therefore, have longer observed repayment histories) to
estimate payment amounts in later years conditional on their earlier loan status, payment
amount, and outstanding balance. Assuming similar repayment dynamics across borrowers
who consolidate in different years, we use these estimates to impute payments beyond the
sample period for all borrowers in our sample. See Appendix B for details.
Unfortunately, our data contain no information on collections or loan rehabilitation af-
ter someone enters default. We, therefore, acquired additional summary records from the
CSLP on the average amounts collected by the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) and total
loan amounts rehabilitated each year after default, both conditional on the amount of loan
last consolidation amount, which we easily correct using repayment records.
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entering default and years since consolidation when the default occurred. We also received
information on average annual loan amounts paid during rehabilitation conditional on the
amount rehabilitated. We use these summary records to impute payments for the first 8
years after default. See Appendix C for details.
4.5 Description of 3rd and 4th Year Undergraduate Borrowers
Our final sample consists of about 39,020 borrowers in 2005 who were enrolled in their
3rd or 4th year of undergraduate studies, with 54% in their 3rd year.18 While we include
borrowers ages 18–30, the average age in our sample in 2005 was 22.5.19 Consistent with
recent post-secondary enrolment patterns, 61% of borrowers in our sample were female. Most
borrowers were either dependent (53%) or single independent (42%) students, while much
smaller shares were married/common law (4%) or single parents (2%).
Figure 1(a) shows that more than half of all CSLP borrowers (56%) came from Ontario,
followed by Alberta (12%) and British Columbia (11%). Figure 1(b) documents the fields
of study in which students were enrolled at the time loans were disbursed in 2005. More
than half of the borrowers in our sample majored in Arts/Sciences, an extremely broad cate-
gory that includes Visual and Performing Arts, Physical and Life Sciences, Behavioural and
Social Sciences, and Humanities.20 Meanwhile, 14% of borrowers majored in Administra-
tion/Business, 10% each in Engineering/Technology and in Health Sciences, 8% in Commu-
nity Services/Education, and only about 1% in Agriculture. Figure 1(c) reports the fraction
of borrowers attending universities by their Macleans ranking.21 The vast majority (98%)
attended a university ranked among the top 49 Canadian institutions, with nearly 40% at-
tending a top 10 university. Enrolment shares decrease as one progresses to lower-ranked
institutions. Finally, Figure 1(d) reports the distribution of total CSLP loan amounts owed
at the end of 2005 for our sample. Roughly half of all borrowers owed $10,000–$19,999, while
about one-quarter owed less and another one-quarter owed more. Only 2% had accumulated
over $30,000 in CSLP student debt. The average total amount owed at the end of 2005 was
$14,800, while the average amount disbursed in 2005 was $5,500 (with a standard deviation
18As required by Statistics Canada, numbers of observations are rounded to the nearest 10 due to confi-
dentiality concerns.
19We characterize borrowers by their situation in 2005, since we measure expected returns conditional on
information available at the time loans are disbursed—2005 in our case.
20See Appendix D for descriptions of each field. Unfortunately, the CSLP data do not contain more
detailed field breakdowns. As noted in Section 4.1, CSLP records can be linked to the PSIS, which provides
a more detailed classification of fields but does not obtain universal coverage for all provinces until 2009.
21See https://www.macleans.ca/education/canadas-top-school-by-reputation-2020/ for 2020
rankings.
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Figure 1: Descriptive Statistics

































































Notes: Descriptive statistics of our baseline sample. Institutional ranks from Macleans ranking.
of $2,100).22
4.6 Average Realized Returns and the Overall IRR
We calculate the realized return, Ri, for each borrower as described in equation (1), using the
discount rate of d = 2.8% to discount annual payments to the year when the undergraduate
22As required by Statistics Canada, all dollar values are rounded to 100 if greater than 1,000 or 10 if less
than 1,000.
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loan was disbursed, 2005.23 This discount rate reflects the 10-year Canadian treasury rate
averaged over 2005–2017.24 For our sample of 3rd and 4th year undergraduates, the average
realized return was -5.7%.
It is important to note that this average return does not reflect the return on all loan
dollars disbursed to this cohort of students, because it does not differentiate between returns
from students who borrowed $1,000 vs. those borrowing $10,000. Yet, this distinction is
important for the CSLP in calculating the total return on its loan portfolio. To measure the
return to the CSLP on the total amount disbursed, we can weight each borrower’s realized
return by the loan amount disbursed to that student in 2005. This loan-weighted average
return is -6.9%, indicating that, on average, the CSLP lost 6.9 cents for every dollar it
lent to this cohort. Consistent with this negative return, we obtain an overall IRR of only
1.6% for our sample, more than one percent less than the average 10-year treasury rate we
use to calculate realized returns. Any discount rate above 1.6% would imply a negative
loan-weighted average realized return.
5 Heterogeneity in Returns Across Borrowers
In this section, we discuss average (unweighted) returns and IRRs for different subgroups
of students based on their demographic characteristics, home province, field of study, and
post-secondary institution ranking. We then use multivariate regression to estimate the
extent to which these factors help predict differences in realized returns across borrowers.
These estimates are used to calculate predicted returns based on information observed by the
government at the time student loans were disbursed. These predicted returns are critical
for evaluating concerns about adverse selection and potential cream-skimming by private
lenders as discussed below in Section 7.
23While we focus on the returns to loans disbursed in 2005, many borrowers that year also took out loans
in other years. Our calculations assume that the returns on all loans (e.g., across years) consolidated by a
student are the same. See Appendix A.3 for details.
24The 10-year horizon accords with the standard 10-year repayment period for CSLP loans (including the
6 month grace period after completing school). The years 2005–2017 cover this period for borrowers in our
sample, who consolidate from 2005 to 2008. We also repeated our analysis with a discount rate of 4.1%,
the government’s estimated (nominal) cost of borrowing during the 2005–06 loan year as reported by the
Office of the Chief Actuary (2006). Using this higher discount rate produces average realized returns that
are about 6.5% less than our reported values using d = 2.8%; however, the higher discount rate has little
effect on the cross-borrower differences in returns that we emphasize.
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Table 1: Average Return, IRR, Early Default, and Early RAP Enrolment by Borrower
Characteristics
Realized Returns Default within RAP within
Population Subgroup Mean Std. Error IRR First 3 Years First 3 Years
All -5.7% 0.1% 1.6% 6% 30%
Gender
Female -5.4% 0.2% 1.7% 5% 30%
Male -6.2% 0.2% 1.5% 7% 30%
Dependency Category
Married/Common law -8.8% 0.7% 1.0% 7% 33%
Single parent -24.7% 1.4% -1.0% 16% 53%
Single independent -4.2% 0.2% 1.8% 6% 29%
Dependent -6.0% 0.2% 1.6% 5% 30%
Year in Study
Year 3 -7.9% 0.2% 1.3% 6% 31%
Year 4 -3.0% 0.2% 2.0% 5% 30%
Issue Province
Alberta 0.2% 0.3% 2.7% 3% 19%
British Columbia -4.3% 0.3% 1.7% 5% 22%
Manitoba -3.8% 0.8% 1.8% 8% 20%
New Brunswick -9.6% 0.7% 1.3% 7% 45%
Newfoundland and Labrador -7.0% 0.8% 1.7% 9% 40%
Nova Scotia -11.8% 0.8% 0.9% 12% 42%
Ontario -7.0% 0.2% 1.3% 6% 32%
Prince Edward Island -8.4% 1.6% 1.4% 10% 38%
Saskatchewan 1.3% 0.5% 2.9% 4% 22%
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) report the average realized return and its standard error (in %), respectively.
Column (3) reports the IRR (in %) on all loans disbursed to the listed subgroup. Columns (4) and (5)
report the percent of borrowers who ever defaulted or enrolled in RAP (or IR), respectively, during the
first 3 years of repayment.
5.1 Average Returns and IRRs
Table 1 reports average returns (and their standard errors) by demographic characteristics,
home province, field of study, and ranking of institution attended. On average, women gen-
erate a 0.8% higher return than men, which is somewhat surprising in light of the well-known
disadvantage women face in the labour market (Fortin, 2019). Average returns are slightly
lower for dependent students relative to single independent students; however, returns are
nearly -25% for borrowers who were single parents during their upper years of undergraduate
studies.
Borrowers in their 3rd year of university generate a 4.9% lower average return than those
in their 4th year. About half of this difference can be explained by the fact that payments
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typically begin one year later for 3rd year (relative to 4th year) students, coupled with the
lack of interest charges during school.25 The remaining gap is likely due to lower degree
completion rates among 3rd year relative to 4th year students. Prior research shows that
dropouts experience more repayment difficulties, likely due to diminished earnings prospects
(see, e.g., Gross et al., 2009; Looney and Yannelis, 2015). Both of these factors suggest that
returns are likely to be even lower for undergraduates in their 1st or 2nd years of university.
Looking across provinces, we observe substantial differences in returns, ranging from a
high of 1.3% in Saskatchewan to a low of -11.8% in Nova Scotia. In general, returns appear
to be lower in the Atlantic provinces and higher in Western Canada.
Table 2 shows that student choices about what and where they study also have impor-
tant implications for student loan repayment. At the high end of the return distribution,
Health Science majors generate modest positive returns of 0.8%, while those majoring in
Arts/Sciences—more than half of all borrowers—yield a strong negative return (-8.9%) that
is nearly 10 percentage points lower. Interestingly, returns are highest (though still nega-
tive) for students enrolled in institutions ranked 11–20 rather than those attending top-10
Canadian universities. Ironically, this is not because students attending top schools are more
likely to experience repayment difficulties—see the last 2 columns of Table 2, which report
the fraction of borrowers who default or enroll in RAP during the first 3 years of repay-
ment.26 Rather, many of these students repay their loans quickly, which results in fewer
borrowers who generate large positive returns (due to r > d) to offset losses from those who
do not repay in full.27 We observe the lowest returns (-11.2%) for borrowers who attended
unranked institutions.
Tables 1 and 2 also report IRRs computed separately for each subgroup of borrowers.
Looking across different borrower types, IRRs are generally high among borrowers with high
average realized returns; although, the correlation is not perfect. Across provinces, IRRs
range from a low of 0.9% in Nova Scotia to a high of 2.9% in Saskatchewan. Arts/Sciences
majors produce an IRR of only 1.0%, while Health Science and Agriculture majors generate
an IRR of 2.9%. Consistent with the patterns for average realized returns, borrowers at-
tending schools ranked 11–20 have the highest IRR (2.1%), while those attending unranked
25Discounting payments of 3rd year borrowers to their 4th year (rather than 3rd year) implies an adjusted
realized return of (1 + d)(1 + R) − 1. This adjustment would raise the average return from -7.9% to -5.4%
for our sample of 3rd year students.
26Our measure of RAP enrolment includes those enrolled in IR prior to the introduction of RAP in 2009.
Borrowers from the 2005 cohort would not typically have been eligible for DRR before 2009.
27For example, 43% of borrowers in our sample who attended top-10 institutions had fully repaid their
loans during the first 3 years of repayment, compared to only 30% of borrowers from schools ranked 11–20.
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Table 2: Average Return, IRR, Early Default, and Early RAP Enrolment by Fields of
Study and Institution Ranking
Realized Returns Default within RAP within
Population Subgroup Mean Std. Error IRR First 3 Years First 3 Years
Field of Study
Administration/Business -2.4% 0.3% 2.2% 3% 27%
Agriculture 0.4% 0.7% 2.9% 1% 20%
Arts/Sciences -8.9% 0.2% 1.0% 8% 36%
Community Services/Educ. -1.6% 0.4% 2.5% 3% 28%
Engineering -2.7% 0.3% 2.2% 3% 21%
Health Sciences 0.8% 0.3% 2.9% 2% 14%
Institution Ranking
Rank 1–10 -4.6% 0.2% 1.7% 4% 25%
Rank 11–20 -3.3% 0.2% 2.1% 5% 28%
Rank 21–30 -7.9% 0.3% 1.2% 7% 37%
Rank 31–40 -6.9% 0.4% 1.4% 8% 34%
Rank 41–49 -8.9% 0.5% 1.2% 8% 37%
Unranked Universities -11.2% 1.2% 0.8% 10% 38%
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) report the average realized return and its standard error (in %), respec-
tively. Column (3) reports the IRR (in %) on all loans disbursed to the listed subgroup. Columns (4)
and (5) report the percent of borrowers who ever defaulted or enrolled in RAP (or IR), respectively,
during the first 3 years of repayment.
institutions have an IRR of less than 1%.
5.2 Predicted Returns
We next examine the extent to which borrower returns can be predicted conditional on in-
formation available to the CSLP at the time loans were issued in 2005. As described in
Section 3.3, we regress individual realized returns, Ri, on the total amount borrowed at the
end of 2005 (allowing for nonlinearities with a linear spline function), available borrower char-
acteristics (indicators for gender, family/dependency status, age, and year in undergraduate
study), home province, field of study indicators, and institution indicators for all ranked
universities (with all unranked schools the base/omitted category). Coefficient estimates
(with standard errors) for this ‘basic’ specification are reported in column (5) of Appendix
Table E1, which reports results for several other specifications as well. Here, we summarize
key results by focusing on the roles of important determinants of estimated returns and the
predictability of returns, noting that nearly all of the factors we include in our prediction
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model are significantly related to borrower returns.28
Figure 2 summarizes the estimated effects of (a) home province, (b) field of study, and (c)
institution of attendance on realized returns as estimated by our ‘basic’ prediction model,
comparing these estimated effects with the raw differences in average returns reported in
Tables 1 and 2. In panels (a) and (b), we sort estimated effects for provinces (relative to
Ontario) and fields (relative to Arts/Sciences), respectively, from highest to lowest raw re-
turns, whereas panel (c) sorts estimated effects by institutions (relative to unranked schools)
according to their Maclean’s ranking (from top to bottom ranked).29 Panel (a) shows that
differences in student borrowing, characteristics, and schooling choices account for some of
the differences in returns across most provinces; yet, important differences remain even when
conditioning on these factors. Focusing on the extremes, the raw difference of 13.1% in av-
erage returns between Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia drops to 9.1% after accounting for all
other factors. Panel (b) shows that differences by field of study are not driven by student
borrowing, characteristics, or institution of attendance. Appendix Table E1 further shows
that, once one controls for borrower characteristics and province, whether or not one controls
for the amount borrowed or institution of attendance has negligible impacts on estimated
differences across fields. By contrast, panel (c) reveals that differences in returns across in-
stitutions are substantially affected by differences in student borrowing, characteristics, and
field of study. Indeed, accounting for these other factors reduces the variance of estimated
institution effects by 68%.30 Panel (c) provides further evidence that institutional ranking
provides little information about the returns on student loans, except to the extent that
unranked institutions yield significantly lower returns than all but a few ranked schools.
These results indicate that students’ field of study is more important than the school they
attend in determining the returns on their student loans. Based on our ‘basic’ prediction
model, we find that differences in returns across fields account for 22% of the variance in
predicted returns, while differences across institutions account for less than half as much
(9%).31
28It is important to note that, with one exception noted in Section 7.1, our analysis does not depend on
any causal interpretation of these prediction estimates. We are only interested in quantifying the extent to
which lenders might be able to predict returns and the factors that aid in that prediction.
29Although we include indicators for all institutions in estimation, Statistics Canada does not allow public
release of statistics at the institution level for universities in Manitoba, Prince Edward Island, or Newfound-
land and Labrador. Estimates for 5 universities are, therefore, excluded from panel (c) of Figure 2.
30This reflects the reduction in the variance of borrower-level predicted returns when controlling only for
institution indicators (i.e., raw differences in average returns) and when controlling for other factors (based
on coefficient estimates from the specification reported in column (5) of Appendix Table E1).
31These are based on the variance of predicted returns (from the specification reported in column (5) of
Appendix Table E1) when holding all other factors constant except field of study or institution attended
relative to total the variance of predicted returns from the model.
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Figure 2: Estimated Differences in Expected Returns
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Notes: Panel (a) reports raw differences in expected returns by province (relative to ON) and estimated
coefficients on province indicators from the prediction model reported in column (5) of Appendix Table E1.
Panel (b) reports raw differences in expected returns by field of study (relative to Arts/Sciences) and esti-
mated coefficients on field indicators from the prediction model reported in column (5) of Appendix Table E1.
Panel (c) reports raw differences in expected returns by institution (relative to unranked universities) and
estimated coefficients on institution indicators from the prediction model reported in column (5) of Appendix
Table E1; estimates for 5 schools in Manitoba, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland and Labrador are
not shown by agreement with Statistics Canada.
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Thus far, our ‘basic’ prediction model has accounted for differences in the level of returns
across borrowers from different backgrounds, provinces, or studying in different fields or at
different institutions, but it has assumed that returns for all borrowers are equally sensitive
to student debt levels. To relax this assumption, we add to the ‘basic’ specification a set
of interactions between province, field of study, and institution indicators with de-meaned
loan amounts by year in undergraduate study. We refer to this extremely rich specification,
reported in column (6) of Appendix Table E1, as our ‘extended’ prediction model, using it
throughout the rest of the paper unless otherwise noted. The R2 statistic for this specification
suggests that information about borrowers at the time loans are disbursed explains 12.3%
of the variation in their returns: the CSLP knows a lot about its borrowers that can help
predict future payments.32
The same predictive information is also readily available to other private lenders, raising
potential problems for the CSLP. To see why, note that perfect competition in this loan
market would imply no predictable differences across borrowers, since any expected profits
would be arbitraged away (e.g., through more attractive loan terms) while expected losses
would be truncated (e.g., through higher interest rates or different loan limits). We discuss
the potential for private cream-skimming of profitable borrowers below in Section 7.
The distributions of both realized and predicted returns are shown in Figure 3. The realized
return distribution exhibits peaks at returns of less than -50% (associated with default) and
a large hump over returns ranging from -10% to 20%. As a reference point, a 4th year
(3rd year) borrower making all standard payments throughout the repayment period would
generate a return of 10.8% (7.8%). The mass over higher returns indicates that a modest
fraction of borrowers delays some payments while still repaying in full. The fact that most of
the distribution lies below 8% indicates that many borrowers do not fully repay their student
loans. The strong negative skewness in realized returns (associated mostly with default and
RAP) means that the median realized return is notably higher than the mean return (-5.7%)
and positive: 1.1%. Still, 46% of all upper-year undergraduates in our sample generate a
negative return on their student loans.
The dashed line in Figure 3 shows the overall dispersion in predicted returns, with a sharp
peak just below zero and clear negative skewness. Not surprisingly, we cannot perfectly
predict which borrowers will default, so we do not see the same small peaks for predicted
returns below -50% that are observed for realized returns; yet, the long left tail of the
predicted return distribution reflects the fact that some borrowers predictably make very
32By comparison, our ‘basic’ prediction model explains 10.6% of the variation. More sophisticated predic-
tion models can only improve upon the explanatory power of even our richest specification.
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Figure 3: Distributions of Realized and Predicted Returns
Notes: Distributions based on kernel density estimation using the Epanech-
nikov kernel and optimal bandwidths of 0.012 for realized returns and 0.008
for predicted returns.
low payments due to default or prolonged enrolment in RAP. These low-return borrowers
pull down the median predicted return (-4.7%). Moreover, nearly three-in-four upper-year
undergraduates are predicted to yield a negative return.
6 Informational Content of Early Default and RAP
Both Canada and the U.S. use default rates over the first 3 years of repayment as performance
indicators for government student loan portfolios. While Canada only publishes these default
rates (nationally, provincially, and for many institutions), the U.S. goes a step further by
sanctioning post-secondary institutions with sufficiently high default rates by withdrawing
their eligibility for federal student aid. While not typically used as such, early RAP enrolment
may also be a strong indicator of poor returns on a loan, since borrowers enrolled in RAP
qualify for reduced payments, interest forgiveness, and eventually forgiveness of loan principal
amounts—see Section 2 for details. If borrowers only enroll in RAP for a year or two, forgiven
interest payments are unlikely to significantly reduce the returns on the loan; however,
borrowers who spend several years on RAP may generate much lower returns. In this section,
we explore the extent to which default or RAP enrolment in the first 3 years of repayment
indicate poor expected returns, E(Ri), over the life of the loan.
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Table 3: Loan Status by Year of Repayment
Years in Fraction Fraction Fraction
Repayment Fully Repaid Entering Default Entering RAP
1 15.6% 0.1% 24.8%
2 25.0% 4.0% 3.7%
3 31.1% 1.5% 1.7%
4 37.0% 1.1% 1.0%
5 42.5% 0.7% 0.6%
6 48.5% 0.6% 0.4%
7 54.2% 0.5% 0.3%
8 60.5% 0.4% 0.2%
Notes: The first year in repayment corresponds to the year consolidation
took place. Fraction fully repaid is cumulative. Fractions entering default
and RAP refer to the first time a borrower enters that status. Some borrow-
ers on RAP may subsequently enter default.
The official 3-year default rate for the cohort of all CSLP loans entering repayment in
2006–07 was 16%, while the default rate among university students was much lower at 10%
(Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, 2009). In other words, 10 cents out of
every loan dollar university students consolidated in 2006–07 was in default within 3 years
of consolidation. Rather than focus on defaulted amounts, we focus on default rates among
borrowers. Table 3 shows that in our baseline sample of upper-year undergraduates who
borrowed in 2005, the fraction defaulting at any point during their first 3 years of repayment
was around 6%, while 30% of all borrowers enrolled in RAP over that same period. The
vast majority (82%) of borrowers who enrolled in RAP within 3 years of repayment did so
the very first year. By contrast, since a loan is deemed in default when it is in arrears for
more than 270 days, very few borrowers enter default during the first year of repayment.
Interestingly, the fraction (first) entering default or RAP declines monotonically over time.
The last two columns of Tables 1 and 2 report early default and RAP enrolment rates for
the subgroups of borrowers examined earlier. As with average returns, we see considerable
heterogeneity across provinces, fields, and institutions. In most cases, early default and RAP
enrolment rates are high for borrowers with low average returns. For example, borrowers
from Saskatchewan generate the highest average returns (1.3%), very low default rates (4%),
and modest RAP enrolment rates (22%), while borrowers from Nova Scotia yield the lowest
average return (-11.8%) and have among the highest default (12%) and RAP enrolment
(42%) rates. We observe a similar pattern across fields of study in Table 2, where we see
that students majoring in Arts/Sciences are outliers with the lowest average returns (-8.9%)
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and highest default (8%) and RAP enrolment (36%) rates. Consistent with their low average
returns, students attending unranked universities have high early default and RAP enrolment
rates of 10% and 38%, respectively.
Looking more closely at institutions, we calculate average returns, as well as early default
and RAP enrolment rates, for each ranked institution in Canada plus all unranked universi-
ties combined. We find that, in general, institutions with high default rates also tend to have
high RAP enrolment rates: the correlation coefficient is 0.65. More importantly, the cor-
relations between average institutional returns and both early default and RAP enrollment
rates are quite strong (-0.81 and -0.84, respectively). Altogether, these results suggest that
3-year default and RAP enrolment outcomes are both good, if imperfect, early indicators of
lifetime expected returns on student loans.
Figure 4 shows dramatic differences in the distribution of realized returns for borrowers
who default early vs. those who neither default nor enter RAP during the first three years of
repayment. Returns are almost always negative for borrowers who default early, while they
are mostly positive for those who experience no repayment difficulties early in the repayment
process. The distribution of returns for borrowers who enroll in RAP during the first 3 years
of repayment looks like a mixture of the return distributions for those who default and those
with no early repayment problems. These patterns are well-summarized by the average
returns, which are quite negative (-60%) for those who default early, higher but still quite
negative (-17%) for those who enroll in RAP early on, and positive (3%) for those who
experience no early repayment problems. Although losses of 60% on borrowers with early
default are substantial, they also indicate that the government continues to collect modest
sums from borrowers even after they default.
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Figure 4: Realized return, kernel density
Notes: Distributions based on kernel density estimation using the Epanech-
nikov kernel and optimal bandwidths of 0.024 for the early default group,
0.043 for the early RAP group, and 0.011 for those with no early repayment
difficulties.
7 Cross-Subsidization, Cream-Skimming and Risk-Based
Loan Limits
Our results point to considerable heterogeneity in expected returns based on ex ante observ-
able characteristics of student borrowers. Indeed, our basic prediction model (see Section 5.2)
implies that the expected return on a $15,000 loan issued to a 3rd year student attending the
lowest return school in Nova Scotia majoring in Arts/Sciences is −20%, while the same loan
issued to a 4th year student attending the highest return school in Saskatchewan majoring
in Health Sciences is over 15%. These vast differences in returns indicate a high degree of
cross-subsidization within the federal student loan system.
While there is nothing inherently wrong about the idea of some students subsidizing oth-
ers, there are several reasons one might want to characterize this phenomenon. First, it
is important to know whether implicit subsidies to different students are consistent with
overall government objectives. Second, there may be more efficient ways to subsidize some
students than through reduced debt repayments. Third and perhaps more importantly,
cross-subsidization across ex ante identifiable groups of borrowers is largely incompatible
with competitive private markets (see, e.g., Puelz and Snow, 1994). This raises concerns
that private lenders could exploit the cross-subsidization by cream-skimming ex ante high-
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return borrowers, leaving an uncomfortable choice for the CSLP between subsidizing loans
to all students or facing a deteriorating pool of borrowers—options that could threaten the
viability of the program itself.
Below, we characterize the extent of cross-subsidization using field of study as an example.
We also use our model of predicted returns from Section 5.2 to compute borrowing limits
that could ensure non-negative expected returns for each field of study. Finally, we show
how the pool of student loans would be affected if the private sector were to cream-skim
individual borrowers with particularly high predicted returns.
7.1 Cross-Subsidization and Borrowing Limits across Fields of
Study
Table 4 reports average loan-weighted returns across fields of study. As discussed earlier,
returns differ widely across majors. Given our coarse measure of fields, the majority of bor-
rowers are in Arts and Sciences who collectively borrowed over $120M in 2005 and inflicted
over $12M in losses to the program. The meager revenues from Health Science and Agri-
culture borrowers are clearly insufficient to cover these losses. Nevertheless, these numbers
highlight the fact that students across fields of study do not contribute equally to the CSLP’s
bottom line.
We further illustrate this point by looking at net revenues/losses, after netting out the
overall cost of the program (thereby normalizing average returns for the entire program
to zero). This framing is consistent with the notion that the federal government knowingly
subsidizes each borrower by about $375 through the CSLP and focuses squarely on the cross-
subsidization within the pool of borrowers that arises explicitly from differential returns. As
one might expect, these numbers suggest that borrowers in Arts and Sciences are cross-
subsidized to various degrees by borrowers enrolled in all other fields: per borrower, each
Arts and Sciences student receives about $200 from students in other fields, who themselves
give between $200 and $400 each. Cross-subsidization is prevalent even at this broad level
of aggregation, underlining the scope for cream-skimming as discussed below.
One instrument that is commonly used to mitigate lending risk consists of a limit on
the amount of credit extended to certain borrowers.33 The last column of Table 4 reports
one potential set of loan limits: the maximum loan amount consistent with a non-negative
33CIBC, for example, advertises terms (loan limits as well as interest rates) on student loans that are
explicitly contingent on field of study, although it emphasizes professional programs such as law, medicine,
and MBA’s.
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Table 4: Cross-Subsidization across Fields of Study
Avg Loan- Total Total Net
Weighted Amount Revenue Revenue Loan
Field of Study Return Issued or Loss or Loss Limit
Health Sciences 0.6% $23,241,000 $131,535 $1,562,369 $20,300
Agriculture 0.4% $3,024,000 $12,054 $214,849 $17,500
Community Serv./Educ. -2.1% $18,502,000 -$388,407 $809,588 $14,000
Engineering -3.2% $20,034,000 -$639,517 $753,762 $12,200
Admin./Business -3.5% $28,964,000 -$1,001,963 $1,089,833 $11,300
Arts/Sciences -10.7% $119,880,000 -$12,767,544 -$4,430,401 $0
Notes: ‘Total Amount Issued’ reflects the total value of all loans issued in 2005 to 3rd and 4th year under-
graduates in our sample. ‘Total Revenue or Loss’ reflects the ‘Avg Loan-Weighted Return’ multiplied by the
‘Total Amount Issued’ to borrowers in that field. ‘Net Revenue or Loss’ is a normalized version of ‘Total Rev-
enue or Loss’ that sums to zero across all fields; it nets out total program losses by effectively subsidizing each
borrower the average loss of $375. ‘Loan Limit’ reflects the loan amount that would yield an average return
of zero for borrowers within each field of study given the characteristics of borrowers in that field (based on
estimated coefficients from column (5) of Appendix Table E1).
expected return for the average borrower in each field of study. In calculating these limits,
we use the ‘basic’ model of expected returns estimated in Section 5.2 and the fact that
predicted returns are monotonically decreasing in student loan amounts.34 A student with
average characteristics borrowing up to these limits would be predicted to net a zero return,
whereas the same student borrowing less than the limit would generate a positive return.35
The results in Table 4 show that these risk-based loan limits vary considerably across fields
of study. Notably, Arts and Sciences majors would be precluded from borrowing altogether
under this scheme, whereas students in other fields would face debt limits varying from
$11,300 in Administration/Business to $20,300 in Health Sciences.
34Our ‘basic’ prediction model implies that expected returns conditional on choice of major m can be
written as E(R(L)|m) = E(XBβB + δI |m) + Γ(L), where XB reflects observable borrower characteristics
(i.e., gender, dependency category, age, year in study, province), δI reflects institution effects, and Γ(L)
reflects the (non-linear) effects of loan amounts. Since estimated returns are monotone in the amount
borrowed—Γ(L) is a strictly decreasing function—we can use the estimated coefficients from column (5) of
Appendix Table E1 to compute the amount of debt that would imply a zero average return on all loans issued
to students in each field of study. If some current borrowers continued to borrow less than the calculated
limits, the limits would imply positive average returns.
35We note two important caveats. First, these loan limits assume a causal relationship from loan amounts
to returns; otherwise, reductions in borrowing induced by tighter loan limits need not raise returns. Second,
these calculations ignore any behavioral responses in terms of field of study or who borrows.
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7.2 Cream-Skimming
Given the prevalence of cross-subsidization within the student loan program, one concern is
that private lenders could poach students with particularly attractive expected returns. Ta-
ble 5 displays back-of-the-envelope calculations for several potential levels of cream-skimming
by private lenders. Imagine that private lenders had access to our data and used our most
sophisticated model to predict returns based on information available at loan origination. If
private lenders managed to successfully attract all student borrowers with an expected re-
turn of at least 5% at the time of origination, they would poach around 7% of all upper-year
undergraduate borrowers. The pool of borrowers in the CSLP would then consist of the bot-
tom 93% of borrowers ranked by expected returns. Naturally, that would reduce the return
on loans issued by the CSLP, exacerbating program losses by nearly 1 percentage point. If
private lenders could manage to poach all borrowers who generate a positive return, overall
CSLP losses would rise to nearly 10%.36
We highlight two important limits of these simple calculations. On one hand, they assume
that students would be willing to switch to private lenders at the time of origination, which
is far from obvious given interest grace periods and potential future payment reductions
through RAP.37 On the other hand, our calculations also assume that poaching only occurs
at origination. In practice, private lenders can go after student borrowers at various points
in time as the information set changes: at loan origination; at degree completion; at consol-
idation; after first employment; and so on.38 As information flows both to private lenders
and student borrowers, a market with even more targeted borrowers could emerge, further
deteriorating the quality of the pool of borrowers remaining in the program.
36These cream-skimming figures implicitly assume that private lenders can discriminate on all observable
factors, including some that are prohibited by law, like age and gender. Because these characteristics are
relatively weak predictors of loan returns, eliminating them from our prediction model would lead to only
minor adjustments in these calculations.
37While nothing prevents private lenders from offering contracts that mimic that provided by the CSLP,
their more limited enforcement capabilities likely reduce the profitability of such an effort.
38In the U.S., for example, SoFi has been aggressively advertising their student loan refinancing program,
which emphasizes various post-graduation outcomes such as job offers, employment, or steady income.
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All borrowers 100% -6.9% 1.6%
Exclude predicted returns > 10% 99% -7.0% 1.6%
Exclude predicted returns > 5% 93% -7.7% 1.4%
Exclude predicted returns > 3% 87% -8.4% 1.3%
Exclude predicted returns > 1% 78% -9.4% 1.2%
Exclude predicted returns > 0% 74% -9.9% 1.1%
Notes: Exclusion of borrowers with high predicted returns is based on estimates
from column (6) of Appendix Table E1.
8 Conclusions
Using newly available administrative records from the CSLP, covering roughly 10 years of
student loan repayment histories, this paper offers a first look at lifetime returns on student
loans as earned by the Canadian government. We draw 3 main conclusions from our analysis:
(1) the aggregate return on student loans is quite low; (2) there is an enormous amount of
heterogeneity in individual realized returns; and (3) a significant portion of this heterogeneity
is readily predictable at the time of loan origination.
The fact that the aggregate return is low should not be too surprising: if the program were
highly profitable, the private sector would simply take over. As it stands, losses of about
7 cents for every dollar disbursed and an aggregate internal rate of return of 1.6% for the
upper-year undergraduates we study, the program as a whole is not particularly attractive
to private lenders.
Despite the negative aggregate return, the median borrower generates a slightly positive
return as the distribution of returns is negatively skewed due to default and prolonged
episodes of repayment assistance. More generally, realized returns differ markedly across all
individual and institutional characteristics: returns are higher for females than for males; in
Western relative to Atlantic provinces; at highly ranked relative to low/unranked schools,
for 4th relative to 3rd year students, and for all majors relative to those in Arts and Sciences.
To put these differences in perspective, aggregate losses for the CSLP program (for upper-
year undergraduates) amount to a $375 implicit subsidy to each borrower, while differential
returns across fields implies a subsidy of about $200 to each Arts and Sciences borrower paid
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for by students in other fields at costs of between $200 and $400 each.
This type of cross-subsidization is prevalent within the CSLP: a simple prediction model
of student loan returns—based exclusively on information observed by the CSLP at the
time of loan disbursement—explains 12% of the variation in individual returns. This ex
ante heterogeneity is generally inconsistent with a competitive market, which would tend
to truncate negative returns and arbitrage away positive returns through more attractive
contract terms. And while average returns are negative, the presence of many borrowers with
high predicted returns raises concerns about cream-skimming by private lenders. Taking a
very simple approach, we show that if private lenders could effectively poach all upper-year
borrowers earning returns of 5% or more, the CSLP would see its average return fall by
nearly 1 percentage point.
Several challenges remain open for future work. For example, the cream-skimming is-
sue clearly calls for a theory of private lending and dynamic cream-skimming, accounting
for degree completion, post-school earnings, and partial repayment histories. The value of
the latter as an opportunity for private cream-skimming is highlighted by our results docu-
menting the strong relationship between early repayment outcomes and long-run returns. A
still more ambitious agenda would consider the implications of unobserved differences across
borrowers and the extent to which this further exacerbates adverse selection problems for
government programs and the student loan market more generally. From a purely statistical
view, advances in more sophisticated prediction models based on machine learning could
point to more severe problems down the road. Finally, while we characterize returns for
the 2005 cohort of borrowers—largely due to data availability—it will prove interesting to
study variation across cohorts, for its own right but also in relation to aggregate conditions,
especially since the Great Recession came and went over the period covered by the data.
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Appendix A Variable Construction and Data Inconsis-
tencies
This appendix describes the construction of our main variables (loan amount, payments, and
returns), the data inconsistencies we encounter, and how we address those inconsistencies.
To facilitate our discussion, we introduce the following variables and their definitions from
the CSLP data codebook:
balstudyend : Balance of student loan at the end of the study period. It does not include
any amount repaid before the end of study.
graceint : Interest accrued over the 6-month non-repayment period following study end
date.
paidprin: The total amount of principal that has been repaid.
paidint : The total amount of interest that has been repaid.
outprin: The principal amount that is not yet repaid.
A.1 Loan Amount
In the data, borrowers may have multiple loan consolidations due to leaving and returning
to school. For each consolidation, the consolidation amount is the sum of balstudyend and
graceint, which should be cumulative and reflect the total outstanding balance at the time.
To construct the loan amount variables, we begin with the last consolidated loan and
its repayment. In theory, outprin + paidprin should equal balstudyend + graceint if no
payments were made prior to consolidation. We can use either for the last consolidation
amount, denoted Ll, if this equality holds. In many cases, this equality is not respected.
One common case is that for borrowers who have multiple loan consolidations, the case
officer may find it convenient to close the earlier loan with a “paid in full” status, despite
the fact that the loan is not fully repaid, and combine the unpaid portion into the later
loan. When the later loan consolidation amount does not include the outstanding amounts
from previous consolidations, a discrepancy arises between the repayment record (paidprin
+ outprin) and the reported last consolidation amount (balstudyend + graceint). In this
case, we use paidprin + outprin for the last consolidation amount Ll.
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Another reason outprin + paidprin sometimes differs from balstudyend + graceint for
the last consolidated loan is that paidprin includes payments made prior to the last loan
consolidation, while balstudyend is net of payments made before consolidation. As a result,
outprin + paidprin is greater than balstudyend + graceint. In this case, we track all payments
made since the year of loan disbursement (2005) and set the last consolidation amount Ll to
balstudyend + graceint for the last consolidated loan.
In other cases with discrepancies, there is no clear explanation. For these unexplained
cases, we exclude about 4,400 borrowers from our sample for whom the absolute discrepancy
between paidprin + outprin and balstudyend + graceint is at least 5% of balstudyend +
graceint ; otherwise, we set Ll = paidprin+ outprin for the last consolidated loan.
Because borrowers may continue their education beyond the undergraduate level, the final
consolidated loan does not always reflect undergraduate borrowing alone. We, therefore,
create another loan variable, Lu, which represents the amount of the last consolidated un-
dergraduate loan. For borrowers whose last level of study was undergraduate, we have
Lu = Ll. For those who attend other levels after their undergraduate studies, we cal-
culate Lu in the same way as Ll based on the last consolidated undergraduate loan (i.e,
Lu = paidprin + outprin at the time of last undergraduate consolidation if no payments
were made prior to that date); otherwise, we set Lu = balstudyend + graceint. The use of
Ll and Lu to calculate returns is explained further in Section A.3.
We use two additional loan amount variables in our analysis: the total loan amount as
of 2005, which we use in prediction model regressions, and the loan amount disbursed in
2005, which we use as weights in computing average loan-weighted returns. The total loan
amount as of 2005 equals the total loan amount borrowed as of the end of undergraduate
study less grace period interest and any additional amount disbursed after 2005. The loan
amount disbursed in 2005 is directly taken from disbursement records in 2005.
A.2 Payments





(paidprint − paidprint−1) + (paidintt − paidintt−1), where P print (P intt ) denotes payment
towards principal (interest) in year t. We favor using paidprin over outprin to calculate
principal payments, because the change in outprin includes not only borrower payments but
also amounts paid by the government. When a borrower is in RAP stage 2, for example,
outprin declines even when the borrower makes no payment; however, paidprin does not
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change in this case, reflecting the borrower’s own payment amount.
Because a separate record is created whenever the loan status changes or at the end of a
loan year, there may be multiple values for paidprin, paidint, and outprin in any given loan
year. The highest values for paidprin and paidint for each loan year are used as the end-
of-year amounts, while the lowest value of outprin for each year is used as the end-of-year
amount.
Issues with paidprin/paidint
Because paidprin and paidint are both cumulative amounts, they should not decrease over
time. However, we observe significant declines in paidprin and paidint for many borrowers
from British Columbia (BC) from the 2010–11 loan year to the 2011–12 loan year. Con-
versations with the CSLP indicate that these cases are associated with BC becoming an
integrated province in 2012, which led to known loan reconciliation issues in their records.
To solve this problem, we use outprin when appropriate. For those in standard repayment
(not on RAP), we set P print = outprint−1 − outprint, since all payments should be made by
borrowers themselves. If paidintt − paidintt−1 is also problematic, we impute the interest
payment P intt using the fact that payments are made towards interest first, in which case we
should generally expect that
paidintt−1 − paidintt−2 = outprint−2 × r, (2)
and
paidintt − paidintt−1 = outprint−1 × r, (3)
for any interest rate r. Using equation (2) to substitute in for r in equation (3), we impute
interest payments as follows:




Fortunately, this imputation provides a very good approximation to interest payments for
cases in other years/provinces that were unaffected by the 2012 BC loan integration process.
If the borrower is on RAP (not in Stage 2 or permanent disability, PD), we set P print =
outprint−1−outprint. Because the government covers interest when the borrower is on RAP,
we assume that P intt = 0 if paidintt < paidintt−1, (i.e., P
int
t = max{paidintt−paidintt−1, 0}).
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If the borrower is on RAP Stage 2 or RAP–PD, when the government covers both interest
and principal amounts, we assume P print = 0 and P
int
t = max{paidintt−paidintt−1, 0}. This
reflects the fact that the vast majority of borrowers enrolled in RAP make zero payments.
There are several hundred additional cases (for borrowers not from BC in 2011–2012) for
which paidprin or paidint decreases. In most cases paidprin (paidint) decreases by less than
5% of the consolidation amount, in which case we adjust it by setting paidprint (paidintt)
equal to the maximum of its current or any earlier reported values, so it is non-decreasing.
This ensures that annual payments are non-negative. Roughly 40 borrowers experience a
decrease in paidprin that is 5% or more of the consolidation amount. We exclude these
borrowers from our sample.
A.3 Returns
Given the loan amounts and payments, we calculate realized returns using equation (1). For
those who did not make any payments prior to their last consolidation, the calculation is
straightforward. We discount all payments made since the last consolidation to 2005, divide
the sum of discounted payments by the last consolidation amount less any grace period
interest (i.e., L0 = Ll − graceint) and then subtract 1. We use the same measure of returns
for borrowers whose last loan was not for undergraduate studies under the assumption that
the returns are identical for all of a borrower’s loans. This is equivalent to assigning payments
after leaving school proportionally to the amounts owed for each loan.
For borrowers who made payments prior to their last consolidation, if their last study
level was undergraduate, we discount all payments beginning in 2005 back to 2005. The
loan amount L0 equals Ll − graceint plus any payments made between 2005 and the last
consolidation. If their last study level was not undergraduate, we assume that repayments
are proportional to amounts owed from different levels of study. We discount payments made
towards the undergraduate loan beginning in 2005 back to 2005. The loan amount L0 equals
the amount of the last consolidated undergraduate loan, Lu, less the associated grace period
interest plus payments made between 2005 and last undergraduate loan consolidation.
A.4 Effects of Sample Exclusions
Our analysis is based on 3rd and 4th year undergraduates who borrowed in 2005–2006.
To ensure observation of sufficient repayment periods, our sample excludes borrowers who
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consolidated more than 6 years after starting their undergraduate studies. We also exclude
borrowers whose repayment records show sizeable unexplained discrepancies, as discussed in
Sections A.1 and A.2.
We explore the implications of our sample restrictions for early repayment behavior and
borrower characteristics in Table A1. Column (1) reports descriptive statistics for full-
time undergraduate students who borrowed in the 2005–06 loan year, subject to our age,
major, and institution restrictions but not the consolidation year or data consistency. The
sample in column (2) excludes those who consolidate after their 6th year since beginning
their undergraduate studies. This has little effect on the average 2005 loan amount or early
repayment behavior. Changes in the sample composition are generally small except that
excluding those who consolidate late produces a sample with 9% fewer Arts/Sciences majors
and modest increases in the share of borrowers from other fields. Column (3) is our baseline
sample, which excludes borrowers with data inconsistencies (in loan amount or paidprin)
or missing key variables (payments, loan amount, or return) from those in column (2).
Comparing columns (2) and (3) shows that excluding borrowers with inconsistencies has
negligible impacts on the composition of our sample.
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Table A1: Descriptive Statistics for Different Samples
All 3rd and 4th Excludes Late Baseline
Year Borrowers Consolidators Sample
(1) (2) (3)
Sample size 66,990 43,620 39,020
Average loan disbursed in 2005 5,500 5,500 5,500
Fraction default in first 3 years 5% 6% 6%
Fraction enter RAP in first 3 years 33% 31% 30%
Fraction paid in full in first 3 years 28% 31% 31%
Average age 22.4 22.6 22.5
Gender
Female 61% 60% 61%
Male 39% 40% 39%
Dependency Category
Married/Common law 4% 4% 4%
Single parent 2% 2% 2%
Single independent 40% 44% 42%
Dependent 54% 50% 53%
Issue Province
Alberta 12% 13% 12%
British Columbia 11% 11% 11%
Manitoba 2% 2% 2%
New Brunswick 5% 5% 5%
Newfoundland and Labrador 3% 3% 3%
Nova Scotia 5% 5% 5%
Ontario 56% 55% 56%
Prince Edward Island 1% 1% 1%
Saskatchewan 5% 5% 5%
Year in Study
Year 3 54% 54% 54%
Year 4 46% 46% 46%
Field of Study
Administration/Business 11% 14% 14%
Agriculture 1% 1% 1%
Arts/Sciences 65% 56% 57%
Community Services/Educ. 7% 9% 8%
Engineering 9% 10% 10%
Health Sciences 8% 10% 10%
Institution Ranking
Rank 1-10 38% 37% 37%
Rank 11-20 21% 22% 22%
Rank 21-30 19% 19% 19%
Rank 31-40 12% 13% 13%
Rank 41-49 7% 8% 8%
Unranked Universities 2% 2% 2%
Notes: Column (1) consists of the full sample of 3rd and 4th year undergraduate bor-
rowers ages 18–30 during the 2005–2006 loan year. Column (2) restricts the sample to
borrowers who consolidate within 6 years after starting their undergraduate studies.
Column (3), our baseline sample, excludes borrowers from column (2) with significant
loan amount or repayment inconsistencies, as well as borrowers missing key variables.
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Appendix B Post-Sample Payment Imputations
We do not always observe the entire repayment history for borrowers. Therefore, we use
data from borrowers who consolidate earlier and have longer observed repayment periods
to impute payments after the observed period for borrowers who consolidate later. This
appendix describes our imputation approach.
While our analysis generally uses data from 2005 onward, we incorporate data back to
2003 in order to impute payments after the observed sample period for our sample of 2005
borrowers. Incorporating these earlier years of data allows us to use repayment patterns for
borrowers consolidating in 2003 (2004), who we observe for 13 (12) years of repayment, to
predict payments in year 13 (12) of repayment conditional on earlier loan status, repayment
amount, and outstanding debt.39
Let c be the last consolidation year for a borrower. For c ∈ {2003, 2004, ..., 2008}, the
longest observable payment period is t′ = (2016− c) years. For borrowers who last consoli-
dated in 2003, we observe up to 13 years of repayment, while we only observe up to 8 years
of repayment for borrowers who last consolidated in 2008.
For each c in {2003, 2004, ..., 2007}, we use borrowers who last consolidated in c (i.e.,
ci = c) to regress their last observed payment, Pi,t′ , conditional on payment Pi,t, outstanding
loan balance Li,t, and status Si,t, at t years after consolidation for 8 ≤ t < t′. Assuming
repayment dynamics are similar across cohorts, estimates from the fitted models are then
used to predict payments t′ years after consolidation, P̂i,t′(Pi,t, Li,t, Si,t), for borrowers from
later cohorts who are last observed t years after consolidation, i.e., who last consolidated
in 2016 − t (ci = 2016 − t > c).40 For example, we use borrowers who last consolidated in
2003 and have t′ = 13 years of observed payments to regress their payments at t′ = 13 on
(Pi,t, Li,t, Si,t) at t = 8 to predict payments at t
′ = 13 for those who last consolidated in
2008.
Our prediction model used to impute future payments relies on two indicator variables
related to loan amounts outstanding. First, we create an indicator variable for whether out-
standing debt exceeds $3,000: D1,i,t = 1(Li,t > 3000). Second, we create an indicator variable
for whether continuing to make the same payment Pt for each post-consolidation year t+1 to
39We address data inconsistencies in these earlier years, which are more common than from 2005 onward,
in the same way as with our main sample.
40We also explored specifications that conditioned on borrower characteristics (e.g., gender, field of
study), but these characteristics had very low (generally insignificant) predictive power after conditioning
on (Pi,t, Li,t, Si,t).
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where r is the applicable interest rate on the loan. The first indicator is useful in differentiat-
ing repayment behavior for smaller and larger remaining balances, while the second enables
us to differentiate between loans that would or would not be paid off by period t′ if the
borrower continued making the same annual payment amount. The latter is quite important
(especially when t′ is only a few years later than t), since many borrowers have reasonably
stable repayment patterns several years into their repayment period. To see why, note that
a borrower making a payment of $1000 in year t and who only owes $500 in year t + 1 is
likely to repay Pt+1 = $500 that year, while that same borrower is likely to make a payment
of roughly Pt+1 = $1, 000 if he owes more than that amount.
Recognizing that payments cannot be negative nor exceed the amount owed (with interest),
we estimate Tobit regressions with a lower limit of zero and an upper limit of the outstanding
balance at post-consolidation year t plus interest, i.e., (1 + r)t
′−tLi,t, where r = 5.5%. We
estimate separate regressions for borrowers in repayment at t vs. on RAP at t.
For borrowers in repayment in post-consolidation year t, we regress Pi,t′ on Li,t, Pi,t, Li,t×
D1,i,t, Pi,t × D1,i,t, D2,i,t,t′ , Li,t × D2,i,t,t′ , and Pi,t × D2,i,t,t′ . When creating D2,i,t,t′ , we use
r = 5.5% for these borrowers.
We have much smaller sample sizes of borrowers on RAP. To avoid overfitting predicted
payment amounts, we use simpler specifications for some of these borrowers.41 For borrowers
on RAP in post-consolidation year t, when c = 2003 (i.e., t′ = 13) and 10 ≤ t ≤ 12, we
regress Pi,t′ only on Li,t and Pi,t, since we have fewer than 100 observations. When c = 2003
and t < 10, we have more observations, so we regress Pi,t′ on Li,t, Pi,t, D2,i,t,t′ , Li,t ×D2,i,t,t′ ,
and Pi,t × D2,i,t,t′ . For c ≥ 2004, sample sizes are larger still, and we estimate the same
specifications as for borrowers in repayment.
Table B1 reports estimated coefficients from these Tobit specifications for all (t, t′) when
using the 2003 and 2005 cohorts, with Panel (A) reporting results for borrowers in repayment
in year t and Panel (B) reporting results for borrowers enrolled in RAP in year t.42 Columns
report results for different specifications (separately by year t repayment status) depending
on the cohort c and post-consolidation years t and t′ for which payments in t′ are predicted
conditional on payments and loan amounts from t. The results are qualitatively similar across
specifications and suggest that higher year t outstanding loan amounts and payments (Lt, Pt)
predict higher payments in subsequent years t′. As expected, coefficients on Pi,t×D2,i,t,t′ are
41Because the government covers unpaid interest when borrowers are on RAP, we use r = 0 when creating
D2,i,t,t′ indicators for borrowers on RAP at t.
42Results for other cohorts are similar.
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typically significantly negative. For t close to t′, we generally observe estimated coefficients on
Pt of roughly 1 and coefficients on Pi,t×D2,i,t,t′ of roughly -1. This is consistent with predicted
future payments Pt′ being very similar to earlier payments Pt, except when continuing to
make the same payment Pt each year would more than fully repay the loan by period t
′.
Based on these prediction models, we impute payments up to 13 years after consolidation
for every cohort. Since almost no borrowers continue to make payments more than 15 years
after consolidation, we use the imputed payment and remaining balance in t = 13 to impute
payments for 2 more years. First, consider borrowers in repayment when last observed.
If continuing annual payment P̂i,13 over the next two years would fully cover their debts,
we assume that they continue making this payment (or reduced amounts once the debts
are covered). If continued payments of P̂i,13 would not cover their debts, we assume that
P̂i,14 = P̂i,15 are raised so that the loan is fully repaid. Second, if the borrower is on RAP
when last observed, we assume that he will continue to make the same annual payment P̂i,13












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix C Collections and Loan Rehabilitation after
Default
When a loan enters default, it is “Returned to Government” from CSLP’s third-party Service
Provider, and the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) takes responsibility for loan collection.
When a loan is rehabilitated, loans are sent back to the Service Provider for additional
repayment. Unfortunately, loan histories in our data are broken whenever a default occurs,
so we cannot generally track collections by the CRA or repayments in rehabilitation. We,
therefore, impute payments following any default using summary data on repayment in
collections and in rehabilitation provided to us by the CSLP.
These summary data contain the following statistics based on all borrowers who entered
default or rehabilitated their loan between April 1, 2010, and March 31, 2011:
ΦColl,t(LD, TD): Fraction of student loan debt entering default, LD, in year TD
collected from CRA in year t since default.
ΦRehab,t(LD, TD): Fraction of student loan debt entering default, LD, in year TD
rehabilitated in year t since default.
θRehab,τ (LR) Fraction of the amount rehabilitated, LR, repaid during year τ since
rehabilitation.
These fractions are based on 6 bins for LD or LR: $1–3,000; $3,001–6,000; $6,001–10,000;
$10,001–15,000; $15,001–20,000; and $20,001 or more. Td reflects 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5+ years.
Payment rates are available annually for 8 years after default or rehabilitation. We impute
payments in year t = 1, ..., 8 since default, Pt(LD, TD), as a function of the loan amount at
the time of default, LD, and year of default (since consolidation), TD, based on the following:








The first term in brackets reflects the fraction of debt initially defaulted on that is collected
from CRA each post-default year t, while the second term reflects the fraction of debt
initially defaulted on that is collected through rehabilitation in post-default year t. The
latter is calculated as sum of the fraction of debt in default that was rehabilitated each year
up to post-default year t multiplied by the fraction of that rehabilitated debt that is repaid
in post-default year t.43
43This approach implicitly assumes that borrowers who rehabilitate their student loans do not exit rehabili-
tation and that they hold similar loan balances when they enter rehabilitation as they had when they initially
defaulted. This and other reasonable assumptions have little impact on post-default payment amounts Pt,
42
See Tables C1–C3 for ΦColl,t(LD, TD), ΦRehab,t(LD, TD), and θRehab,τ (LR) as provided by
the CSLP.
since loan rehabilitation rates, ΦRehab,t(LD, TD), are extremely low (less than 3% for nearly all (LD, TD)
combinations).
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Table C1: ΦColl,t(LD, TD)
LD
$1–3,000 $3,001–6,000 $6,001–10,000 $10,001–15,000 $15,001–20,000 $20,001 or more
TD = 1 24.6% 12.5% 8.0% 6.4% 5.5% 3.7%
TD = 2 28.1% 16.1% 9.7% 7.8% 6.6% 5.0%
t = 1 TD = 3 30.8% 17.9% 11.6% 8.6% 7.4% 5.8%
TD = 4 31.9% 17.0% 12.4% 8.9% 6.5% 4.9%
TD = 5+ 27.9% 16.3% 11.0% 7.9% 6.7% 3.0%
TD = 1 15.5% 10.3% 7.9% 5.8% 4.8% 3.9%
TD = 2 15.4% 13.0% 9.7% 7.4% 8.0% 4.8%
t = 2 TD = 3 15.0% 13.3% 11.1% 7.3% 6.3% 5.2%
TD = 4 14.2% 13.0% 11.1% 7.9% 7.4% 4.7%
TD = 5+ 11.9% 11.0% 9.4% 7.1% 4.0% 5.0%
TD = 1 10.1% 9.5% 7.3% 5.7% 5.1% 3.7%
TD = 2 10.9% 11.2% 8.8% 7.6% 7.5% 4.6%
t = 3 TD = 3 12.7% 9.4% 10.2% 8.2% 6.4% 4.5%
TD = 4 9.2% 10.4% 9.7% 8.4% 6.9% 5.8%
TD = 5+ 9.3% 8.9% 7.8% 6.6% 4.8% 4.2%
TD = 1 8.0% 8.0% 7.0% 5.7% 5.1% 3.7%
TD = 2 8.6% 9.5% 7.7% 6.6% 6.9% 4.7%
t = 4 TD = 3 9.4% 10.2% 9.4% 6.7% 6.9% 4.7%
TD = 4 8.8% 7.8% 8.2% 7.5% 5.2% 5.6%
TD = 5+ 6.5% 6.4% 6.3% 6.4% 4.8% 4.1%
TD = 1 7.6% 7.1% 6.5% 5.4% 5.1% 3.7%
TD = 2 7.8% 7.3% 7.3% 7.0% 7.0% 4.6%
t = 5 TD = 3 6.0% 8.1% 7.8% 6.7% 6.2% 5.5%
TD = 4 5.4% 7.1% 7.6% 5.9% 5.5% 5.4%
TD = 5+ 5.4% 5.8% 5.4% 6.0% 3.7% 4.1%
TD = 1 3.0% 4.2% 4.1% 4.0% 4.5% 3.5%
TD = 2 2.7% 5.0% 5.4% 5.4% 5.6% 4.4%
t = 6 TD = 3 3.9% 5.5% 4.8% 5.9% 5.0% 4.6%
TD = 4 2.6% 4.8% 5.7% 6.0% 6.4% 4.8%
TD = 5+ 3.8% 3.6% 4.1% 4.9% 4.3% 3.8%
TD = 1 1.1% 2.4% 2.5% 3.3% 3.1% 3.3%
TD = 2 1.6% 3.0% 3.8% 4.2% 5.2% 4.0%
t = 7 TD = 3 2.3% 3.0% 3.6% 4.1% 4.9% 3.9%
TD = 4 2.6% 4.0% 3.8% 3.7% 4.5% 4.4%
TD = 5+ 2.0% 2.7% 3.2% 2.8% 3.6% 2.7%
TD = 1 0.7% 1.4% 2.0% 2.6% 3.3% 3.0%
TD = 2 1.3% 2.1% 2.7% 3.3% 4.2% 3.1%
t = 8 TD = 3 0.8% 2.0% 2.2% 3.9% 4.5% 3.8%
TD = 4 0.9% 2.3% 3.6% 2.8% 4.8% 3.5%
TD = 5+ 1.6% 2.0% 2.2% 3.1% 3.5% 2.5%
Notes: These statistics are based on data provided by CSLP from newly defaulted loans established in Departmental
Accounts Receivable System (DARS) from April 1, 2010 to March 31, 2011.
44
Table C2: ΦRehab,t(LD, TD)
LD
$1–3,000 $3,001–6,000 $6,001–10,000 $10,001–15,000 $15,001–20,000 $20,001 or more
TD = 1 1.5% 1.7% 1.3% 1.7% 2.1% 2.1%
TD = 2 2.0% 2.3% 2.1% 2.5% 2.5% 3.4%
t = 1 TD = 3 1.2% 1.7% 2.1% 3.3% 1.7% 2.4%
TD = 4 0.6% 1.7% 1.8% 2.1% 2.0% 2.8%
TD = 5+ 0.3% 1.2% 1.9% 2.8% 2.8% 0.9%
TD = 1 1.9% 2.0% 1.7% 2.6% 2.3% 1.9%
TD = 2 1.7% 1.7% 2.1% 3.1% 2.1% 2.6%
t = 2 TD = 3 1.2% 1.3% 1.4% 2.2% 2.9% 2.7%
TD = 4 0.1% 1.3% 1.6% 1.9% 2.3% 1.9%
TD = 5+ 0.4% 1.1% 0.7% 1.2% 2.0% 0.9%
TD = 1 1.0% 1.3% 1.1% 1.1% 1.6% 1.5%
TD = 2 1.1% 1.2% 1.3% 1.4% 1.2% 1.1%
t = 3 TD = 3 0.5% 0.7% 0.6% 1.2% 1.5% 1.1%
TD = 4 0.3% 0.6% 0.5% 1.5% 1.8% 2.1%
TD = 5+ 0.2% 0.1% 0.8% 0.4% 1.1% 2.0%
TD = 1 0.5% 1.0% 1.1% 0.6% 1.4% 1.4%
TD = 2 0.3% 0.6% 0.8% 0.7% 1.4% 1.9%
t = 4 TD = 3 0.7% 0.6% 0.4% 0.4% 1.5% 1.4%
TD = 4 0.5% 0.2% 0.3% 0.2% 0.7% 0.6%
TD = 5+ 0.0% 0.3% 0.2% 0.3% 0.5% 0.5%
TD = 1 0.3% 0.5% 0.8% 1.0% 0.5% 0.8%
TD = 2 0.2% 0.7% 0.3% 1.3% 0.5% 0.4%
t = 5 TD = 3 0.2% 0.7% 0.7% 0.4% 0.7% 1.5%
TD = 4 0.1% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 0.6%
TD = 5+ 0.4% 0.0% 0.2% 0.6% 0.6% 0.0%
TD = 1 0.3% 0.3% 0.5% 0.6% 0.9% 0.9%
TD = 2 0.3% 0.2% 0.4% 0.8% 1.2% 0.8%
t = 6 TD = 3 0.0% 0.1% 0.4% 0.6% 0.7% 0.4%
TD = 4 0.1% 0.0% 0.3% 0.5% 0.6% 0.8%
TD = 5+ 0.1% 0.0% 0.6% 1.2% 0.7% 1.0%
TD = 1 0.1% 0.4% 0.4% 0.8% 0.7% 0.9%
TD = 2 0.1% 0.4% 0.4% 0.7% 1.8% 1.0%
t = 7 TD = 3 0.1% 0.4% 0.7% 0.5% 1.1% 0.5%
TD = 4 0.5% 0.4% 0.4% 0.7% 0.8% 2.1%
TD = 5+ 0.1% 0.1% 0.4% 0.7% 0.9% 0.2%
TD = 1 0.4% 0.2% 0.3% 0.7% 0.2% 0.8%
TD = 2 1.0% 0.5% 0.3% 0.3% 0.8% 0.7%
t = 8 TD = 3 0.0% 0.2% 0.3% 0.5% 0.5% 0.6%
TD = 4 0.0% 0.1% 0.3% 0.3% 0.6% 0.8%
TD = 5+ 0.0% 0.3% 0.2% 0.4% 0.9% 0.4%
Notes: These statistics are based on data provided by CSLP from newly defaulted loans established in Departmental
Accounts Receivable System (DARS) from April 1, 2010 to March 31, 2011.
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Table C3: θRehab,τ (LR)
LR
$1–3,000 $3,001–6,000 $6,001–10,000 $10,001–15,000 $15,001–20,000 $20,001 or more
τ = 1 16.6% 8.5% 4.9% 2.9% 6.5% 5.0%
τ = 2 13.3% 8.4% 6.6% 6.0% 3.1% 8.1%
τ = 3 12.9% 7.5% 6.4% 6.4% 5.5% 4.6%
τ = 4 14.2% 9.7% 6.3% 5.8% 4.7% 4.8%
τ = 5 14.1% 7.7% 5.4% 6.9% 6.9% 5.3%
τ = 6 14.3% 8.6% 8.2% 5.8% 7.2% 3.4%
τ = 7 14.9% 10.0% 6.9% 4.7% 5.2% 6.6%
τ = 8 12.0% 4.7% 7.6% 4.8% 7.0% 3.2%
Notes: These statistics are based on data provided by CSLP from loans that were rehabilitated from De-
partmental Accounts Receivable System (DARS) from April 1, 2010 to March 31, 2011.
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Appendix D Details on Field of Study
The following table lists detailed areas of study for our CSLP field of study classification.
Table D1: CSLP Field of Study Classification
Field of Study Area of Study
Administration/Business Business Administration; Accounting; Commerce; Communica-
tions; Court Reporter; Hotel Administration; Hospitality; Market-
ing; Media Resources; Municipal Government; Public Relations;
Realty Appraisal; Stenography; Programming; Systems Analysis
Agriculture Agriculture; Veterinary Medicine; Environmental Sciences;
Forestry; Horticulture; Dairy Farming; Fish and Wildlife
Arts/Science Archaeology; Astronomy; Biology; Chemistry; Ecology; Eco-
nomics; Fine Arts; Geography; Geology; History; Linguistics; Ma-
terial Science; Mathematics; Philosophy; Physics; Psychology; So-
ciology; Statistics; Physiology; Library Science; Theatre; Visual
Arts; Crafts; Interpreting Journalism
Community Service/Education Community Services; Counselling; Social Work; Rehabilitation;
Visiting Bookmaker; Outdoor Recreation
Engineering/Technology Engineering; Electronics; Instrumentation; Kinetics; Pilot Train-
ing; Architecture; Urban/Regional; Planning; Navigation; Marine
Engineering; Waste Technology
Health Sciences Dietetics; Home Economics; Chiropractice; Chiropody; Podia-
try; Registered Nursing; Registered Assistant Nurse; Optometry;
Pharmacy; Laboratory Techonology; X-Ray Technology; Audiol-
ogy; Speech Therapy; Medical Secretary; Food Products; BIO-
Medical Sciences; Environmental Food; Medical Radiography
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Appendix E Rate of Return Regression Estimates
Table E1: Estimating Predicted Realized Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Loan amt (in $10,000) -0.008 -0.012* -0.009 -0.074***
(Loan amt - 10,000) × 1(amt > $10,000) -0.052*** -0.047*** -0.052*** -0.052***
(Loan amt - 20,000) × 1(amt > $20,000) -0.038*** -0.042*** -0.040*** -0.054***
(Loan amt - 30,000) × 1(amt > $30,000) -0.020 -0.014 -0.016 -0.018
Gender
Female (base) (base) (base) (base) (base)
Male -0.015*** -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.013*** -0.013***
Dependency category
Married/Common law -0.035*** -0.039*** -0.038*** -0.040*** -0.038***
Single parent -0.149*** -0.158*** -0.195*** -0.152*** -0.147***
Single independent 0.003 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.003
Dependent (base) (base) (base) (base) (base)
Age
18 -0.097** -0.105** -0.070 -0.095** -0.125***
19 -0.039*** -0.047*** -0.039*** -0.044*** -0.046***
20 0.000 0.002 0.007* 0.001 0.002
21 (base) (base) (base) (base) (base)
22 0.006 0.005 -0.001 0.005 0.006
23 -0.002 -0.004 -0.017*** -0.003 -0.001
24 -0.017*** -0.020*** -0.039*** -0.018*** -0.019***
25 -0.005 -0.010 -0.031*** -0.009 -0.012*
26 -0.014* -0.020** -0.045*** -0.018** -0.022***
27 -0.009 -0.015* -0.043*** -0.013 -0.016*
28 -0.016 -0.025*** -0.056*** -0.023** -0.028***
29 -0.019* -0.027** -0.061*** -0.025** -0.028**
30 -0.009 -0.020 -0.050*** -0.017 -0.025**
Year in study
3 (base) (base) (base) (base) (base)
4 0.065*** 0.066*** 0.050*** 0.065*** 0.087***
Issue province
Alberta 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.063*** 0.054*** 0.049***
British Columbia 0.040*** 0.027*** 0.022*** 0.034*** 0.029***
Manitoba 0.057*** 0.026*** 0.037*** 0.051*** 0.044***
New Brunswick 0.010 -0.026*** -0.046*** -0.003 -0.012
Newfoundland and Labrador 0.054*** -0.006 -0.020*** 0.030** 0.023
Nova Scotia -0.012 -0.036*** -0.059*** -0.022** -0.021*
Ontario (base) (base) (base) (base) (base)
Prince Edward Island 0.013 0.005 -0.032** 0.000 0.000
Saskatchewan 0.077*** 0.079*** 0.075*** 0.069*** 0.060***





Newfoundland and Labrador 0.017
Nova Scotia -0.005
Ontario (base)
Prince Edward Island 0.002
Saskatchewan 0.053***
Field of study
Administration/Business 0.064*** 0.055*** 0.061*** 0.055*** 0.056***
Agriculture 0.093*** 0.084*** 0.086*** 0.078*** 0.077***
Arts (base) (base) (base) (base) (base)
Community Services/Educ. 0.073*** 0.055*** 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.058***
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Engineering 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.059*** 0.060*** 0.061***
Health Sciences 0.097*** 0.113*** 0.104*** 0.107*** 0.092***







Constant -0.100*** -0.089*** -0.066*** -0.101*** -0.107*** -0.011
Additional Controls:
Institution Yes No No No Yes Yes
Institution × De-meaned loan amount No No No No No Yes
R2 0.087 0.024 0.099 0.067 0.106 0.123
Notes: All specifications based on regressions of realized returns on reported characteristics using the full
sample of 39,020 undergraduate borrowers in 3rd or 4th year of university. *** significant at 1% level;
** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
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